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The essays in this volume, which further extend the National Bureau's
work on interest rates,' fall broadly into three groups. These are con-
cerned with patterns of interest rate fluctuation on a wide variety of
instruments (Cagan and Diller), selected determinants of yield(or
"quality") on risk instruments (Frankena, Fredrikson, and Cohan),
and determinants of maturity structure on riskiess securities (Kessel,
Sargent, and Diller).
Much of the Bureau's work on interest rates has focused on changes
in rate relationships. We have sought evidence of stability versus change
in financial markets and institutions, and insights regarding interactions
between real and financial processes. This focus on patterns of change
characterizes much of our work on the mortgage market, for example,
including earlier studies by Kiaman as well as my own paper in Volume I
of these essays.2 The essays by Cagan and Diller in this volume are in
this tradition. Cagan's essay (which was first published in 1966) ex-
amines changes in the cyclical behavior of interest rates relative to
fluctuations in general business over a long period (some of his series
extend to 1878). Ignoring atypical periods, including World War I and
most of the 1930's and 1940's, he finds that in recent years "financial
Publications to date include TheBehavior ofinterest Rates: A Progress Report
by Joseph Conard, 1966; The Cyc!ical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest
Rates by Reuben A. Kessel, 1965; Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of interest
Rates by Phillip Cagan, 1966; Yields on Corporate Debt Directly Placed by
Avery Cohan, 1967; Essays on interest Rates, Vol. 1, edited by Jack M. Guttentag
and Phillip Cagan, 1969; and New Series on Home Mortgage Yields Since 1951
by Jack M. Guttentag and Morris Beck, 1970.
2SaulB. Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press for NBER, 1961; Jack M. Guttentag, "The Behavior of
Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951," in Essays on Interest Rates, Vol. I.xxiv introduction and Summary
markets react more in unison with each other and closer to changes in
business conditions than formerly." The change isparticularly pro-
nounced in the case of rates on long-term securities, which used to lag
both short-term rates and general business at cyclical turning points,
but do so no longer. In addition, "the amplitude of cycles in most in-
terest rates has responded mOre and more sharply to fluctuations in
business activity of a given severity." Cagan presents evidence (not in-
cluded in this volume) indicating that the change in both cyclical timing
and amplitude of interest rates can be explained in part by changes in
the cyclical pattern of growth in the money supply, which in turn pre-
sumably "reflects greater emphasis by the Federal Reserve on counter-
acting cycles in output and prices. So long as this policy continues, the
generally greater fluctuation of interest rates since World War II com-
pared with earlier periods will, other things being the same, be a per-
manent feature of the money market." Experience during the years
since Cagan first penned those words strikingly confirms the accuracy
of his prediction.
While the focus of Cagan's analysis is changes over time in cyclical
patterns, he might with perhaps equal justification have emphasized
what has not changed. The recent conformity of interest rates to business
cycles, for example, as indicated by the extent to which cycles in one
can be matched against cycles in the other, is not new. "Call money and
commercial paper rates had nearly perfect conformity to the ten refer-
ence cycles from 1885 to 1919." Diller's essay on seasonal fluctuations
in interest rates provides even more dramatic evidence of stability in
change. The significant seasonal pattern in rates that emerged in the
early 1950's appears very similar to the pattern Macaulay found for
call money rates early in the century. Diller suggests that in view of
all the changes in financial practices that have occurred perhaps this is
a coincidence; but perhaps it is not.
Diller's analysis indicates that a seasonal rate pattern emerged in the
early 1950's, the seasonal amplitude rising during 1951—58 and declin-
ing thereafter. By 1965, the seasonal had fallen to very modest propor-
tions, comparable to those of the period before 1951. At peak amplitude
the seasonal pattern that emerged was most pronounced for short-term
securities, next for high grade bonds, and weakest for low grade bonds.
Diller shows that the largest part of the variation in seasonal amplitude
of Treasury bills can be explained by changes in the seasonal amplitude
of the money supply and of total Treasury bills outstanding. Thus, the
rise in the bill rate seasonal through 1958 is largely explained by an
increase in the seasonal of outstanding bills in the face of only a smallIntroduction and Summary xxv
change in the money supply seasonal, while the subsequent decline in
the rate seasonal during 1958—65 can be attributed largely to a rise in
the money supply seasonal.
The substantial influence of the Treasury on the seasonal is not
inconsistent with the proposition that the forces underlying the basic
configuration of the seasonal—a lull close to midyear and a high in
December—are much the same as in the period before 1913. The con-
figuration of the seasonal reflects demand forces, and Treasury opera-
tions may simply be one mechanism through which these forces now
operate. This is a nice problem for future research.
The rise and decline in the rate seasonal corresponds in a rough way
with "tight money" and "easy money" policies of the Federal Reserve.
It is somewhat surprising, in the light of recent discussions of the
pervasiveness of the Federal Reserve's "defensive" open market opera-
tions, that tight money can leave such a substantial margin of seasonal
demands unaccommodated. If the Federal Reserve focused exclusively
on the condition of the money market as its short run objective we
would expect a complete suppression of the rate seasonal regardless of
whether policy was one of tightness or ease. While much remains to be
learned regarding the interrelationship between the system's general
("dynamic") policy stance and its short run ("defensive") role in off-
setting transient disturbances in the market, Duller's findings are con-
sistent with the view that the Federal Reserve employs bank reserve
targets in the short run.
A large part of the Bureau's work on interest rates, including the
essays here by Frankena, Fredrikson, and Cohan, has been concerned
with problems of yield structure. The general problem can be illustrated
with an equation of the following form covering a number of individual
instruments of a given type (such as residential mortgages or high grade
corporate bonds) at a point in time:
Yield =C+aiQ1 +... +b1N1 +...
where the Q's are variables that bear on the probability of repayment—
in the aggregate they describe risk or ex ante "quality"; the N's repre-
sent nonrisk factors that may affect yield such as options to repay prior
to maturity or coupon rate; and the coefficients indicate the degree of
sensitivity of the yield to variability in each yield determinant—in the
case of quality variables they reflect the lenders' expectations regarding
future economic conditions that may affect the ability of borrowers to
repay.
Frankena's essay shows that the coupon rate (and to a lesser extentxxvi Introduction and Summary
call deferments) is an important nonquality determinant of yield on
corporate bonds. The evidence for this rests in good part on the new
time series that he constructed covering yields on seasoned public utility
bonds, each series pertaining to a specified coupon rate. He finds, for
example, that over the period January 1957 to October 1967 the yield
to maturity on 5 per cent bonds averaged 32 per cent more than that on
2% to per cent bonds. Frankena views this relationship as reflect-
ing the market's essential rationality. Higher coupon bonds are less
attractive to investors because, in the event that market yields decline,
they have less potential for price appreciation and they are more likely
to be called for redemption, forcing lenders to reinvest at lower yields.
He questions the reliability, for some purposes at least, of commonly
used series on corporate bonds and yield spreads involving such bonds.
Adjustment of series for changing coupon rates is not an easy matter,
however, since the effect on yield of a given coupon rate differential (or
a given call deferment) can vary markedly over time as a result of
changes in yield levels, in expectations regarding future yield levels, and
in other factors. The yield differential between 5 and 2% to per
cent bonds referred to above ranged from .03 per cent during periods
of high yields to 1.00 per cent during periods of low yields.
The center-stage variable in Fredrikson's essay is the location of the
property in securing a conventional residential mortgage loan. Just as
Frankena's essay indicates that yield series on corporate bonds should
hold coupon rate constant, Fredrikson's essay indicates that yield series
on conventional mortgage loans may have to be adjusted for changes in
geographical mix. While previous Bureau studies (by Wickens, Morton,
and Grebler, Blank, and Winnick) found evidence of significant re-
gional yield differentials in data covering outstanding loans, in-depth
analysis of area differentials awaited the development of data on loan
commitments of the type used here by Fredrikson. These data, compiled
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board beginning in 1962, indicate
that the pattern of area differentials is extremely complex. First, dif-
ferentials between metropolitan areas within regions are substantial, in
some cases exceeding average regional differentials by large margins. In
all probability intraregional differentials would be greater still if ade-
quate data were available for nonmetropolitan areas. Second, area yield
differentials are usually larger, sometimes substantially larger when
measured in terms of effective rate (contract rate adjusted for fees and
charges) than when measured in terms of contract rate alone. Third,
area yield differentials vary markedly among various loan subsets when
loans are classified by type of lender and purpose of loan.Introduction and Summary xxvii
Whether location of property is a quality or nonquality yield determi-
nant is a moot point. Interregional yield differentials are smallest in loan
subsets characterized by relatively low risk—notably loans on new
homes and loans by life insurance companies—suggesting that area
designation may be in part a proxy for risk. Fredrikson shows, however,
that when yields are adjusted for the effect of those risk variables for
which information is available (loan-value ratio, maturity and property
value) area yield differentials are as likely to increase as to decrease.
Loan subsets with small yield differentials furthermore are also those
within which interregional flows are relatively large,, suggesting that in
part area differentials may reflect restrictive local market structures and
factors segmenting local markets from outside competition. Fredrikson
discusses several of these factors including high information costs, legal
constraints on out-of-state lending, and the high costs of acquiring and
servicing loans at a distance.
In his previous National Bureau study, Avery Cohan isolated specific
quality and nonquality factors influencing the yield on directly placed
corporate bonds.3 He then held these factors constant over time to pro-
vide yield series on a homogeneous instrument. Referring to the equa-
tion above, Cohan in effect solved for Y in each period using the same
Q's and N's throughout. The adjusted series, while homogeneous with
respect to objective characteristics, reflect changes in the coefficients of
the Q's and N's. Cohan's essay in this volume extends this procedure in
the following way. Assume for the moment that the N's in the equation
for direct placements can be ignored so that only risk variables affect
yield, and that yields on a government bond are riskless. In this case,
the yield differential between governments and directly placed corporate
bonds of the same maturity measures aiQi +••• + on the
direct placement, i.e., it measures the combined effect of all character-
istics of the direct placement that affect risk, plus the lenders' evaluation
of each characteristic. If it can be assumed further that the markets for
direct placements and government bonds are competitive, and that in-
vestors in direct placements are not risk averse, Cohan shows that the
ratio [(1 +G)/(1+ r) whereG and r are the yields and m the
maturity, can be interpreted as the market's judgment of the probability
that the realized yield on the direct placement will be equal to the
promised yield. Thus interpreted, the ratio is the ideal measure of
over-all ex ante quality of direct placements.
The assumptions required to interpret the ratio as a probability, how-
Op. cit.xxviii Introduction and Summary
ever, are not completely met. In Cohan's view the main nonquality fac-
tors that affect the ratio are differences in call protection and risk
aversion—the requirement of lenders that yield on a risk security ex-
ceed the "expected yield" (expected yield on a risk security is the yield
on a riskless security plus a premium just large enough to meet expected
losses on the risk security). Cob an argues that, in general, risk aversion
is not an important factor in the market (although this may not have
been true before World War II), but that it can become important
when the volume of lower grade securities becomes abnormally large
in a short period, as was the case during 1955—5 8. Hence, Cohan adjusts
his probability series both for changes in call protection and for changes
in the volume of lower grade corporate offerings. The adjusted quality
series tended to decline very modestly over the 195 1—61 period.
Three papers in this volume deal with the term structure of interest
rates on riskiess (government) securities. The question "Why do securi-
ties that are exactly the same in every respect but maturity carry different
yields?" has long exercised a fascination for economists.
The centerpiece of all three essays is what has come to be called the
expectations theory of term structure. This theory in brief states that
term structure at a point in time is determined by the market's expecta-
tions prevailing at that time of future short-term rates. The theory im-
plies that at a given point in time the expected yield is independent of
term to maturity. The expected yield over, say, the next three years is
the same regardless of whether one holds a twenty-year security pur-
chased now and sold after three years, a three-year security purchased
now, a two-year security purchased now and a one-year security pur-
chased after one year, or any other combination. While this theory has
a long and honored list of advocates, including Fisher, Keynes, Hicks,
Lutz, and Macaulay, the recent upsurge in interest traces mainly to
Meiselman, who first devised a means of testing the theory that did not
require that expectations have some predictive content for the theory
to pass. "He showed that expectations, whether or not they are correct,
nevertheless affect the term structure of rates. His results constitute
striking evidence that the expectations hypothesis has empirical valid-
ity .
Kesselaccepts the expectations theory, and presents some (admittedly
limited) evidence that at least at the short end of the yield curve the
expectations implied by the theory do indeed have predictive content.
He argues, however, that some empirical characteristics of yield curves
'Kessel, op. cit.,p.344.Introduction and Summary xxix
are difficult if not impossible to reconcile with a "pure" expectations
model, that is, a model which attempts to explain term structure en-
tirely in terms of expectations. The tendency for curves to be upward
sloping more often than not, for example, and the occurrence at times
of "humped" curves where yields rise with maturity and then decline
are facts difficult to reconcile with a pure expectations theory.
To explain these and other aspects of yield curve behavior Kessel
joins the expectations theory to the liquidity preference theory, which
states that the market on balance prefers short- to long-term securities
because of the smaller risk of capital loss on the former. He shows
that a combination of the two theoriesisconsistent with a wider
range of evidence including most importantly evidence on changes
in the shape of yield curves over the business cycle.5
When Kessel's paper was first circulated in the early 1960's my
impression was that it was an excellent piece of research (which I
still believe today) and that little remained to be done on the subject,
which was a mistake in judgment. Benefit of hindsight suggests several
reasons for the recent upsurge of interest in the problem of term
structure. First,. there has been a widespread and well-justified con-
viction that the validity of the expectations hypothesis required addi-
tional testing. Malkiel and Kane note that "scientists are skeptical men
who know that error of observation and questionable experimental
technique are facts of life.If a law verified by one observer is truly
valid, it should operate for. anyone. Successful and independent repe-
tition of a critical experiment increases our confidence in its supposed
results."6 Sargent's paper is in this spirit. Returning to an approach
that has been abandoned after Meiselman's study, he considers the
question of whether the expectations of future rates inherent in the
yield curve (according to the theory) do in fact have any forecasting
value. A negative finding in an inquiry of this type does not dispose
of the theory, but a positive finding, to use Sargent's words, "pro-
vides a particularly convincing type of evidence confirming the ex-
pectations hypothesis."
Sargent turns to a situation where the market can be presumed
to have some knowledge of future rates. Seasonal patterns in interest
6Someadditional evidence is given by Phillip Cagan, "A Study of Liquidity
Premiums on Federal and Municipal Government Securities," in on In-
terest Rates, Vol. I.
6BurtonG. Malkiel and Edward J. Kane, "Expectations and Interest Rates: A
Cross-Sectional Test of the Error-Learning Hypothesis," Journal of Political
Economy, July/August 1969, p. 453.xxx Introductionand Summary
rates should be anticipated in some degree by speculators and, if
there is any validity in the expectations hypothesis, the seasonal in
longer maturities should lead the seasonal in shorter maturities. (This
testof the expectationstheory wasfirst proposed and used by
Macaulay who examined the timing seasonal in call rates and time
rates during the period 1890—1913.) The reemergence of the seasonal
in Treasury bills during the 1950's (see Diller's first paper) provides
the materials for this test. Using spectral analysis, Sargent finds, as
Macaulay did, that the timing patterns are generally consistent with
those predicted by the expectations theory.7
A second reason for the recent step-up in work on term structure
is the relevance of the problem for monetary policy. In 1961, the
Federal Reserve adopted the policy of attempting to raise yields on
short-term securities while lowering yields or at least limiting increases
on long-term securities. This policy, which came to be known as
"operation twist," was an attempt to deal simultaneously with the
problem of encouraging expansion in the domestic economy, which
required low long-term rates, and the problem of restraining capital
outflows abroad, which required high short-term rates. A crucial issue
was whether a swap transaction by the Federal Reserve, involving
simultaneous purchase of long-term securities and sale of short-term
securities, could have an appreciable nontransitory effect on the yield
curve.
The various theories of how the yield curve is determined appeared
to give opposing answers to this question, thus providing prima facie
justificationfor extensiveeffortstodetermine which theory was
"correct." For a time it was believed by many that the expectations
theory implied that the Federal Reserve could not affect the shape of
the yield curve while the so-called "segmentation theory" of term
structure carried the opposite implication.(This theory states that
borrowers and lenders are constrained by institutional factors to prefer
specific maturities, so that the rate at each maturity is determined by
the supply and demand at that maturity, which is independent of the
supply and demand at any other maturity.) It is now evident, however,
that this view was overly simplistic. WoOd showed that the expecta-
tions theory did not imply the inability of the Federal Reserve to
twist the yield curve if expectations of future rates embodied in the
yield curve are affected by changes in the current rate levels.8 By the
Kessel also ran a test of this sort (see Chapter 6, p. 370).
H. Wood, "The Expectations Hypothesis, The Yield Curve, and Mone-
tary Policy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1964.introduction and Summary xxxi
same token, the institutional preference of most investors for a given
maturity does not necessarily imply that the Federal Reserve has wide
latitude to change the yield curve, since enough investors might be
enticed from their preferred maturity by small yield premiums on
adjoining maturities to make the yield curve relatively insensitive to
Federal Reserve swaps.9 Much the same point can be made regarding
the liquidity preference theory; as Kessel notes, this theory implies
that a Federal Reserve swap will affect the yield curve but does not
imply that the effect is likely to be quantitatively significant.'0 Thus,
no amount of testing of the validity of the individual theoriesis
likely to shed much light on the question of the degree of Federal
Reserve influence on the shape of the yield curve; the question remains
wide open.
The third and perhaps most important reason for continuing in-
terest in the term structure problem isthat itis a fascinating in-
tellectual puzzle—or set of puzzles—that ramifies in many directions.
Meiselinan's original test of the expectations theory was facilitated by
prior work in related fields of economics on the formation and re-
vision of expectations. Future work on the expectations theory will
surely reverse the flow and contribute to general knowledge in this
important area. Duller's paper on "The Expectations Component of
the Term Structure"isa significant stepinthisdirection.Duller
focuses on the nature of the forecasts that (according to the expec-
tations theory)are embodied in the term structure. He poses the
question, What techniques of forecasting future rates does the market
use? He distinguishes an autoregressive or extrapolative component of
a forecast, which is dependent on the current and prior values of the
variables being forecast and on prior values of forecasts of that vari-
able; and an autonomous component, which is dependent on the
current values of other variables. He shows that various theories of
forecasting, including the error-learning theory used by Meiselman
and the "return to normality" theory that has had numerous advo-
cates, can be viewed as specific variants of a general autoregressive
model. "There are, in principal, as many models as there are combi-
nations of weights from an autoregression, although the word 'model'
is ordinarily used only when the particular combination of weights
is consistent with a plausible behavioral hypothesis." This approach
allows Duller to examine various "behavioral theories" of forecasting
See Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate
Policy," American Economic Review, May 1966, p. 184.
'°SeeKessel, op. cit., p. 57.xxxii Introduction and Summary
within a single analytical framework, which has the great advantage
that alternative theories can be clarified as well as tested.
Other ramifications of the term structure problem are just beginning
to be explored. It should be possible to expand the liquidity prefer-
ence theory, for example, to take account of default risk. This suggests
the possibility of a general theory of yield structure in which ma-
turity would be only one (and perhaps not the most important)
dimension. Beyond this is the intriguing possibility of merging term
structure theory with portfolio selection theory, which has developed
rapidly in recent years. (What are the implications for term structure
theory of postulating that investors have a diversification incentive
for holding several maturities?) If ultimately the several term structure
theories are absorbed by broader theories of financial processes we
would have to view it as a triumphant demise.
JACK M. GUTTENTAG